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To Western observers, burning cars have become the symbol of the European failure 
to integrate what tends to be a predominantly Muslim immigrant population.  Recently, a 
New York Times article reported that even in the bastion of welfare-state liberalism, Sweden, 
car-burning is not an unheard-of pastime for immigrant children in poor areas.
1  To European 
states in the process of revisiting their immigration laws, cars may not be the priority, but 
what they symbolize – the ghettoization of immigrant and racial minorities, the failure of 
welfare state programs, the lack of integration of this new wave of immigrants – has recently 
become a renewed priority. 
It was T.H. Marshall
2 who first showed that the programs of the welfare state can 
serve to promote (or deter) integration or assimilation by foreigners.  First, as Gallya Lahav 
notes, “the literature on migration and the welfare state suggests that, historically and 
presently, threats to the welfare state focus on its central features – national identity, 
homogeneity, or solidarity.  …  The principles of the welfare state presuppose the existence 
of non-members.
3  More relevant here, however – and particularly in Western Europe, where 
access to social services is no longer governed by citizenship – is the notion that the 
involvement of immigrants in the welfare state, in programs including, but not limited to, 
educational ones, can help to define them as willing participants in their host country’s 
society, only a step away from the social meaning of citizenship.
4  I employ the term 
integration in this paper to refer to any policy that aims to lower the we/they barrier in the 
                                                 
1 Christopher Caldwell, “Islam on the Outskirts of the Welfare State,” New York Times, 02.05.2006. 
2 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto Press, 1987). 
3 Gallya Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
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hopes of creating greater social harmony and, for the immigrants themselves, prosperity and 
well-being.  Or, as Adrian Favell has it, “integration is said to hinge on formalizing the idea 
of associative membership within the political space of the nation which, by defining 
boundaries and the lines of in/out between citizens and foreigners, establishes the shape and 
unity of a modern nation-state.”
5
I will demonstrate that both France and Germany are pursuing what appear to be on 
first glance incoherent immigration policies, drawing specifically on the German 2003 
Immigration Act, and the most recent avant-projet de loi of French Interior Minister Nicolas 
Sarkozy, a law whose fate will be decided in the coming months.  Though both countries are 
continuing to develop programs that draw on the resources of the welfare state to integrate 
past immigrants, they are simultaneously pursuing new policies of extremely limited 
immigration, or “immigration by choice.”
6  This new direction is specifically apparent in the 
veiled but apparent return of “economic” immigration, until recently banned in Western 
Europe, and, with it, the potential return of the Gastarbeiter (guestworker).  The combination 
of these two realities suggests that while Germany and France are both increasingly ready to 
use welfare state programs to promote integration, they are simultaneously hoping that the 
control of immigration is possible, even within the open-borders Schengen zone.  I will also 
show that these policies are consistent with the ideological legacies of citizenship in the two 
countries. 
 
Theoretical framework: 
 
The notion of  “citizenship” has been continuously defined and redefined in the 
literature.  Here, I will base my evaluation of what I call “citizenship policy” on the work of 
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T.H. Marshall.  In Citizenship and Social Class, Marshall defines citizenship as membership 
in a community that confers full and equal rights and duties.  He defines three types of 
citizenship: civil, political and social.  For Marshall, civil rights began to be conferred in the 
18
th century, political rights in the 19
th century.  It was during the rise of the welfare state in 
the 20
th century, however, that a citizen’s claim to social rights became the norm.  Although 
naturalization and acquisition of  “citizenship” in the modern democratic state involves 
acquisition of all three types of Marshallian citizenship, it is specifically social citizenship 
that is of interest here. 
Secondly, in any evaluation of the “citizenship policy” of France and Germany, the 
reference of choice remains the framework proposed by Rogers Brubaker in his seminal 
Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.  Recent developments in both France 
and Germany, however, suggest that the Jus soli/Jus sanguinis
7 distinction that was 
crystallized throughout the 19
th century is no longer so clearly enshrined in the countries’ 
immigration law, leading some scholars to suggest that the distinction is no longer relevant. 
Certainly, the standard theoretical frameworks for evaluating citizenship and integration in 
these two countries must be reconsidered in the context of new national laws, as well as in 
light of the increasing influence of European Union policy.  But I will show as part of this 
study that the legacies of citizenship law are apparent in the integration and naturalization 
policies of the two countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1992).  Brubaker shows that, historically, German citizenship has been consistently defined by Jus 
sanguinis, in which the right to German citizenship is transmitted, literally, by blood.  In “republican” France, 
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The politics of integration and the role of the (welfare) state: 
 
As noted earlier, lack of citizenship in Western Europe is not technically a barrier to 
access to the welfare state.  Heisler and Schmitter Heisler demonstrate that the relatively easy 
access to social rights can be attributed to a status of “denizenship,” which tends to confer 
most civil and social rights on all those living legally within a country.
8  However, as Hein 
notes, the structure of the welfare state shapes “the employment of migrants in resettlement 
programs, the formation of immigrant associations, and immigrants’ rights to civic 
participation and social citizenship.”
9  One must also distinguish between access to the 
welfare state as such and provisions directed specifically at immigrants.  Lahav refers to the 
former as “direct” provisions of the welfare state, equal distribution of a general allocation of 
benefits.  Still at stake are “indirect” welfare state programs and access, a rubric under which 
Lahav includes special measures on behalf of immigrants, affirmative action and the removal 
of legal discrimination.
10  Moreover, it has been shown historically that access to the welfare 
state – which confers a certain level of well-being and, notably, civic education (for school-
aged children particularly) – can be one of the key factors in promoting successful 
integration.
11  The crucial nature of the welfare state is evident in its use by governments in 
shaping response to immigration policies: for instance, because Germany has long been seen 
by immigrants as a grail of sorts for social welfare, the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act of 
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Weber shows in Peasants into Frenchmen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).  It is no wonder that 
foreigners who have been schooled for five years in French public schools can petition to have the subsequent 
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1993 cut transfers to asylum seekers whose applications had not yet been accepted to 20-30 
percent below welfare levels.
12
It is relevant here, then, to consider the type of state structure, and notably welfare 
state structure, in France and Germany.  Germany’s membership model is a classic example 
of the corporatist state – and welfare state
13  -- in which various trade unions, churches, and 
semi-public organizations play an important role in policy development.  France, by contrast, 
though characterized as a corporatist welfare state by Epsing-Andersen, notably combines 
statist and social democratic policies.  The state plays a significant – almost exclusive – role 
in determining policy, with only trade unions having any particular clout.  For immigrants, 
this means that integration can be only the domain of the state; in Germany, by contrast, 
other organizations are involved in immigrant politics.  Indeed, it is because interest groups 
are so closely linked to the state that they play such key roles in policy formation. 
  Germany inaugurated on January 1, 2005 its first new legislation governing 
immigration.
14  The new law calls for a coordination of integration measures with help from 
churches, trade and labor unions, employers’ associations, voluntary welfare organizations, 
and other social advocacy programs.  In Germany, for instance, the Ministry of the Interior 
specifically supports “the integration of immigrants in local neighborhoods.
15 Both of these 
stipulations are evidence of the corporatist nature of German integration policy.  This is in 
direct contrast with French integration ideology, which holds that the integration of 
neighborhoods as discrete entities tends to reinforce a sense of belonging to a previous nation 
                                                 
12 Ralph Rotte, “Immigration Control Policies in United Germany,” International Migration Review (35:2, 
2000), 380. 
13 See Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990). 
14 Until 2005, immigration, the rights of immigrants, and questions of citizenship were covered by the 
Grundgesetz and subsequent amendments and legal rulings. 
15 Report of the Bundesministerium des Innern, available online 
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or ethnic group (since immigrants tend to cluster in specific geographic areas).
16  This is 
echoed in the lack of accommodation of specific religious practices by French authorities, as 
compared to the German government, which has gone to some lengths to fund, amongst other 
things, Turkish schools and mosque construction.
17 “  By contrast, the “republican model” in 
France has always favored assimilation, both by immigrants and the French, who are 
themselves very guarded about, for instance, public religious displays.  It is no surprise that, 
while access to citizenship has historically been quasi-impossible, the corporatist nature of 
the welfare state allows immigrant participation in many welfare state programs.  
Jennings identifies four characteristics of French thought on the subject of immigrant 
integration: 1) integration of immigrants must be in accord with the secularism of the state; 
2) it is individuals rather than groups that integrate 3) integration presupposes rights and 
duties 4) immigrants and the French must be treated equally.
18  Perhaps the most important 
of these is the notion that individuals may integrate, but not groups: in a republican 
democracy, groups are not to be differentiated as such, and indeed the targeting of nationals 
of a particular country is only likely to bring about dreaded communautarisme.  In Germany, 
bilateral treaties have been established with certain nations, establishing, amongst other 
things, preferential treatment for Turks, for whom unemployment or receiving welfare does 
not affect resident status in Germany.
19
The issue of integration is perhaps more delicate when specific groups cannot 
constitutionally be targeted by welfare state programs.  And, as Favell notes, the French 
welfare state has seen better days: “one of the striking consequences has been the appearance 
                                                 
16 Indeed, Jeannette Money argues that spatial concentration is the source of tension between immigrants and 
citizens of the host country.  See Jeannette Money, “No Vancancy: The Political Geography of Immigration 
Control in Advanced Industrialized Countries,” International Organization (51: 4, 1997), pp. 685-720. 
17 See Joel Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
18 Jeremy Jennings, “Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France,” Bristish 
Journal of Political Science (30:4, 2000) 583. 
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of ghettos and racialised poverty of almost exactly the kind French politicians and 
intellectuals claim ‘couldn’t happen here’: a world not at all reflected in the positive 
republican policy statements about integration and individualist social success for 
immigrants.”
20  Though certain policies, including those of Zone d’urbanisation prioritaire 
and Zone d’éducation prioritaire are, de facto, more consistently applied in places where the 
immigrant population is large, the de jure explanation is that these are poor and violent areas, 
not immigrant ones. 
The new Immigration Act calls for the promotion of the integration of foreigners, 
which is to be largely accomplished through the means of a state-sponsored integration 
course, which “covers measures to acquaint foreigners with the language, legal system and 
culture in Germany and Germany’s history.”
21  The stated goal of the course, however, is to 
“enable them to act independently in all aspects of daily life, without the assistance or 
mediation of third parties.” Immigrants allowed to attend an integration course are 1) those 
receiving a residence permit for the first time; 2) those requiring the course for employment; 
3) those preparing for the subsequent immigration by dependents; immigrants in Germany on 
humanitarian grounds.  An integration course is required for 1) those entitled to attend who 
cannot communicated in German on a basic level; 2) those immigrants whose local 
immigration offers recommends that they do so.  Finally, for foreigners required to attend but 
who do not do so, “the body approving the foreigner’s benefits may reduce the benefits by 
ten per cent for the period of non-attendance.”
22
Since 2003, France has been experimenting with the “Contrat individual d’accueil et 
d’intégration” (CAI), which also consists largely of civic and language courses.  Because it is 
in the form of a contract, however, the CAI also emphasizes, for instance, respect of the laws 
                                                 
20 Favell, 186. 
21 “Act to Control and Restrict Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens and 
Foreigners, Federal Law Gazette Volume 2004, Part I, no. 41, 08.05.2004. 
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of parité, or male-female equality.
23  Until April 2003, only those benefiting from 
reunification with their families in France, families of refugees and foreign members of 
French families were eligible for a CAI.  The law now allows for CAIs to be granted to all 
refugees, those holding the carte vie privée vie familiale and immigrants who have been 
granted the right to work for at least one year.  The French government estimates that this 
will extend the privileges of the CAI from 100,000 to 114,000 people per year.
24  The stated 
goal of the document is specifically to make “the welcome of those foreigners authorized to 
live in France for family reasons, one of the priorities of the politics of integration.” The 
Office des Migrations Internationales is responsible for the bulk of the programs, including 
the presentation of the CAI; testing for French language ability; scheduling for civic, 
linguistic and “Vivre en France” workshops and classes; and help with contacting social 
services. Under the new law, the CAI would become obligatory.  Though in itself, the CAI 
can be described as a housewarming gift, the bureaucratic nature of a “contract” could prove 
a deterrent, especially to illiterate or non-skilled immigrants. 
 
   France Germany 
Language 
courses 
200-500 hours  Basic and intermediate, 
totaling 600 hours. 
  System of government  System of government 
Civic 
courses 
Rights and duties of the 
citizen 
Values of equal rights, 
tolerance, religious freedom 
 
Principles and values of 
the Republic 
“Significance of a free and 
democratic order” 
Social 
work 
Interview with possible 
reference to a social 
worker 
None 
Table 1: Characteristics of French and German integration programs 
Source: Immigration Act 2003 (Germany); ANAEM Web site (France) 
 
                                                 
23 Immediately targeted by critics as a thinly veiled threat to Muslims wishing to import polygamous or abusive 
relationships to France. 
24 Protocole d’accord DPM/OMI/FASILD relatif à la mise en oeuvre de l’expérimentation du Contrat d’accueil 
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The early results from the trial run of the CAI in France, and the first results of the 
new Integrationspolitik show that voluntary integration schemes have not yet found a major 
audience among citizens at whom they theoretically most need to be targeted.  In 2004, 
women formed the majority of those enrolled in the programs in both countries, although the 
difference was more overwhelming in Germany (65,7%) than in France (52.2%).
25  Germany 
reported an enrollment of 90,289 people; the French program, which at the time was in a trial 
run and directed mainly at those benefiting from the policy of regroupement familial, 
enrolled 37,613 people  (out of 41,616 who were offered a contract).  The populations most 
likely to respond to the offer in the two countries say something about the work that is 
needed to integrate other segments of the immigrant population: in Germany, 80.7 percent of 
those enrolled were either unemployed or employed in the home; in France 60.4 percent of 
those enrolled were members of French families. 
 
The return of the Gastarbeiter and the retrenchment of the policy of regroupement familial: 
 
  In its recent response to the avant-projet de loi on immigration in France, Jean-Marie 
le Pen’s Front national noted condescendingly the degree to which the law incorporates or 
anticipates relevant EU law.  The EU certainly has accumulated a considerable number of 
laws and directives related to immigration.  It is already the case that it is Brussels, not Berlin 
or Paris, that establishes which foreign nationals are required to obtain visas prior to long-
term residence in the member states.  Sarkozy’s law specifically echoes a number of 
priorities of EU immigration law, particularly in the targeting of illegal immigration (a 
growing concern for the EU as a whole) and in the partial harmonization of French law with 
current EU law.  Just three months ago, the Commission presented a so-called feuille de 
                                                 
25 See “Integration,” communiqué of the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 08.19.2005 (available 
online on the BMF Web site); and “Contrat d’Accueil et d’Integration: Bilan de l’année 2004,” SSEC (available 
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route (“roadmap”) for legal immigration, which includes specifically targets the development 
of “admission procedures capable of responding promptly to fluctuating demands for migrant 
labour in the labour market.”  The Policy Plan focuses specifically on economic migration 
and consists most importantly of laws aimed at regulating the conditions of entry and 
residence of immigrants and policies aimed at improving the integration of economic 
migrants and their dependents.
26  The focus on so-called “economic” migration is especially 
important because it constitutes a complete reversal of policy: “economic” migration was 
banned in all Western European countries after the oil crisis of 1973. 
  Germany was the first state to sign a bilateral agreement on labor recruitment, in 
1955, with Italy.  Many other European states followed, and continued to important labor 
until November 1973, when labor importation was abruptly ended (throughout Europe).  
Germany ended this period of “economic” migration with 2.6 million foreign workers.  It 
should be noted, however, that these workers were not seen as immigrants, particularly not in 
Germany,
27 but as workers, who would  “help enhance Germany’s economic growth but 
would return to their country of origin when the nation’s labor needs had been met.”
28  It was 
only when Gastarbeiter began claiming moral and legal rights to be reunited with their 
dependents that European countries began to accept family immigration: as Christian Joppke 
notes, “European states did not actively solicit the belated arrival of the spouses and children, 
not to mention the extended family, of its labor migrants.  …  In this sense, European family 
immigration is unwanted immigration.”
29  Family immigration has been historically the most 
difficult to control (among legal forms of immigration), because the reunification of families 
                                                 
26 “Economic migration in the EU – Commission presents a roadmap on Legal Migration,” IP/05/1664, 
12.21.2005.  Available online at http://europa.eu.int. 
27 Because of immigration from former colonies and Algeria, France did witness a fair amount of non-economic 
migration during this time period. 
28 Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 100. 
29 Christian Joppke, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration,” World Politics (50: 2, 1998) 281-
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hinges on principles of fundamental rights.  Moreover, family immigration and the 
suspension of the Gastarbeiter program were related, because it was as workers began to 
settle in Germany that they sought reunification with their families.  It was not until then that 
immigrant policy began to truly include the programs of the welfare state, which were 
required to provide housing, education and health care to the families of what were 
previously thought to be Gastarbeiter.
30  
  The new German neo-Gastarbeiter policy promotes the immigration of self-
employed persons who can create a minimum of 10 jobs and invest one million Euros in the 
German market; further, while the ban on the general recruitment of unqualified labor 
remains, exceptions are now made for individual occupation categories.  The French law, 
should it be enacted, would create lists (though not quotas, which would be unconstitutional) 
of certain understaffed jobs that would specifically permit employers to hire foreign 
workers.
31  The other major provision of the law targets illegal immigration by effectively 
ending so-called “regularization” of illegal immigrants residing in France for ten years, 
which had previously been automatic but will now be subject to case-by-case review by local 
prefectures. Both of these policies would have the effect of emphasizing the need for 
immigrants to return to their home countries.  The policy was made clear when Sarkozy told 
Le Monde that he expected students recruited via new economic migration laws to return to 
their home countries after the end of their studies, noting that he wanted to avoid the “brain 
drain” that leaves some countries with many Bac-4 and others with many Bac+10.
32  In both 
the German and French cases, we are witnessing a new era in which labor-related 
immigration is purposely sought.  For immigrants, the upshot could well be a return to the 
                                                 
30 James Hollifield, “Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science (485: May 1986) 120. 
31 Currently, the list would include mechanics, industrial maintenance workers, hospitality workers (food and 
hotel industries) and nurses. 
32 “Nicolas Sarkozy précise son avant-projet de loi relatif à l’immigration et à l’intégration,” Le Monde, 
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policies of the Gastarbeiter 1950s and 1960s, in which foreigners were not considered 
immigrants. 
A clear shift in the focus of immigration law is evidenced by Sarkozy’s rhetoric of 
“immigration by choice,” as opposed to what he has called an “endured immigration” 
(subie).  Although France has long had a clause waiving residency requirements for 
naturalization for those who “contribute to the radiance of the French nation,” the new law 
aims to be even more explicit about the desire to attract foreign talent. The specifics of the 
proposal include a requirement that the government quantify the number of visas and cartes 
de séjour available based on resources in all sectors, from work to housing to education.  
Amongst other things, the instauration of a Canadian-style points-based system (a system 
that Germany, incidentally, reneged in the Immigration Act).   Perhaps most importantly, 
however, the projet de loi aims to limit the possibility for immigrants to bring families to 
France under the auspices of the politics of regroupement familial.  Specifically, the law will 
extend the waiting period from one to two years, and will make the acquisition of French 
citizenship by foreign spouses more difficult. Although the government claims that the intent 
of the law is not to retreat from France’s consistently pro-family immigration policy, Sarkozy 
still aims to develop firmer restrictions about marriage, requiring three years of cohabitation 
and adherence to the CAI before being granted residence. It is of interest to note that the 
stated goals of the German Immigration Act mim    bic those of the EU “roadmap”: they are 
1) access to the labor market for highly qualified individuals; and 2) the development of an 
active integration policy.  Regulations for subsequent immigration of family members, 
however, have not changed significantly from previous law, though family immigration has 
always been subject to fairly strict rules in Germany.  Most notably, the immigrant must be in 
possession of a settlement or residence permit, as well as adequate living space.  German law                                                                                                                                         Blau  13
also limits immigration of children above the age of 16, who can be granted a residence title 
only in the cases of hardship or “on the basis of a positive integration prognosis.”
33
 
 
The legacy of Jus soli and Jus sanguinis: Myth or reality?  
 
  That France would be a “country of immigration” is certainly consistent with the 
contention that citizenship in France is governed by the laws of Jus soli, which are 
fundamentally more flexible than those of Jus sanguinis.  The republican ideology of Jus soli 
theoretically grants to any foreigner residing (legally) within the country’s borders for the 
required waiting period – or for anyone born in France – the right to citizenship.  It is then no 
wonder that France is, according to many scholars, the only country in Western Europe that 
has a true legacy as a “country of immigration.”  And yet, since the 1990s, Germany’s 
naturalization laws – a good indicator given that immigration as such is not particularly well 
tolerated in either country – come closer to the ideals of Jus soli than French law.  Currently, 
children born in Germany to foreign parents, at least one of whom has been a resident of 
Germany for eight years with an unlimited right to residence, are eligible for German 
citizenship at birth.
34  By contrast, although children born in France to foreign parents have 
“full right” to French citizenship, they can acquire it only at the age of 18, and this only with 
proof of consistent residence in France.
35  As Kastoryano notes, “Germany stands today as 
one of the most liberal states in Europe with regard to citizenship.”
36  In fact, since the early 
                                                 
33 Web site of the Auswärtiges Amt. 
34 Any children who become naturalized in Germany under this law but retain the citizenship of their parents’ 
country must choose between foreign or German nationality at the age of 18. 
35 Specifically, the child must have lived in France continuously since birth, or for at least five consecutive 
years since the age of 11.  Parents can request French nationality for their French-born children at the age of 13 
– with the child’s consent – if the child has lived in France since the age of eight.  A child aged 16 or older can 
request French nationality himself.  However, in both of these latter cases the granting of citizenship is subject 
to declaration, and is not given by “right.” 
36 Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: 
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1980s, the German population has included a higher percentage of foreigners than France 
(see Graphic 1). 
 
Graphic 1: Foreigners as percentage of population 
Source: INSEE and Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 
 
  One cannot conclude summarily, however, that changes in law – brought on not only 
by the constraints of the European Union but also the stress of the foreign-born population on 
the state – are accompanied by immediate reformulation of a country’s conception of the 
citizen.  Kastoryano pessimistically argues that “Germany hesitates between an ethnic 
conception of the nation and the requirements of a democratic society and hence pays lip 
service to the idea of a multicultural society.”
37  And though there has been a considerable 
rapprochement of the two countries’ policies, it is the differences that betray a certain 
continuity.  For instance, one notes in the case of the French law that there is a certain legacy 
of Jus soli: it is not enough for a child to simply be born in France, especially in this era of 
immigration and globalization; to be a citizen of a “republican” state, the child must also 
have spent at least five of his formative years in France. In fact, as recently as 1998, a new 
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law – whose main purpose was to reinstate the automatic acquisition of French citizenship 
for children born in France – specifically reaffirmed France’s commitment to Jus solis. 
German law also betrays a legacy of Jus sanguinis, for instance, in the clear refusal to grant 
German nationality in conjunction with any other, both for immigrants and for German 
citizens who seek to acquire the citizenship of a second country.  Immigration law as pertains 
to so-called Aussiedler (“repatriates”) also reflects the historically-based nature of the 
German definition of “citizen”: after witnessing a steady increase of “repatriates” whose 
spouses and children were not of German origin, a new law as of January 2005 required that 
those accompanying “repatriates” demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the German language.   
Perhaps most importantly, German identity, which is legally defined by the Grundgesetz 
(Article 116) continues to differentiate between Staatsangehörigkeit, or citizenship (to which 
all citizens, of foreign or German origin, belong) and Volkszugehörigkeit, or those who are 
considered by law to have a right to claim German citizenship.  This category continues to 
refer to all those of ethnic German origin, whether German citizens or not, while excluding 
those of all other ancestries, whether or not individuals have German citizenship.  German 
citizenship law dates from the 1913 Grundgesetz, in which Nationalstaatsprinzip affirms that 
there is a material tie between a citizen and his or her nation.”
38  As Herbert Dittgen notes, 
citizenship law is consistently “connected with national identity, collective memories, and 
public expectations about diversity, unity and liberties.”
39
  In Germany, the integration of foreigners continues to be, despite recent legal 
changes, especially difficult in terms of official integration (naturalization).  In 1993, despite 
changes in the early 1990s meant to ease naturalization requirements, almost two-thirds of 
foreigners in Germany had lived their for ten years; perhaps more strikingly, 80 percent of 
                                                 
38 Jeffrey Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies 
Quarterly (43:1, 1999), 97. 
39 See Hermann Kurthen, “Immigration and the welfare state in comparison: differences in the incorporation of 
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foreigners under 18 were born in Germany.
40  In 2004, there were still 1,342,000 children in 
Germany who were considered “foreigners.”
41  Graphic 2 shows that, France has consistently 
approved a rate of naturalization nearly as high as Germany’s (in total naturalizations), 
despite the fact that France has a smaller population of foreigners.  Moreover, Graphic 3, 
which shows naturalizations of Aussiedler, or ethnic Germans (Anspruchseinbürgerungen), 
as a proportion of total naturalizations: it is not uncommon for these naturalizations to 
constitute nearly half of all naturalizations in a given year.  (Foreigners who are not ethnic 
Germans are thus naturalized at much lower rates than Aussieder, and at much lower rates 
than foreigners in France, for example.)  Some scholars have posited that this is in part 
because of the draconian laws against dual citizenship. Moreover, though the wait period for 
naturalization was reduced from fifteen to eight years by recent amendments, naturalizations 
are only granted to foreigners demonstrating knowledge of the German language who are 
committed to the tenets of the Grundgesetz. 
 
Graphic 2: Naturalizations by Year in France and Germany 
Source: INSEE and Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 
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Graphic 3: Anspruchseinbürgerungen (Naturalizations of ethnic Germans) by Year 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 
  
 
  Recent developments in German and French immigration policy show an inclination 
toward return to the Gastarbeiter policies of the mid-twentieth century, where immigrants 
were invited into the country only on the basis of labor needs and where attempts at 
integration are based on the need for job skills and, when necessary, the integration of family 
members.  Moreover, the new laws seem to betray a tendency to believe that the past wave of 
relatively uncontrollable immigration – that has brought much conflict to two societies with 
strong national characters – will have been the last. Given the recent (veiled) resurgence of 
the policy of “economic” migration, it seems possible that integration, in fact, is not designed 
in order to favor immigrants (constitutionally impossible in France in any case), but “for the 
benefit of all and their collective cohesion.”
42  Meanwhile, because of EU restrictions, 
German and French immigration and citizenship policies are coming to resemble each other 
even more.  And yet, there is evidence that the legacies of Jus soli and Jus sanguinis remain.  
Indeed, although one commentator pointed to the 1990 German immigration law as evidence 
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of a tendency towards Jus soli principles, given its lack of reference to ethnic and cultural 
assimilation, the new Immigration Act is particularly firm on the need for integration.  In 
Germany, some activists continue to argue for immigration policy targeted at specific groups, 
with the hopes that the subsidization of ethnic organizations could help to facilitate 
integration into mainstream society.
 43  Ironically, it is German critics of immigration policy, 
not French, who have historically argued that the extension of rights and opportunities to 
immigrants could serve to reduce the need for strong group identity, thereby preventing the 
development of an ethnic underclass.  The French, meanwhile, continue to oppose any 
differentiation among ethnic groups, a move some contend has contributed to the civil unrest 
of the past few years.  In both cases, one must certainly consider whether the patterns of 
assimilation of certain Polish immigrants in Germany, the Irish and Italians in America, and 
other groups throughout the Western world, were a time-specific occurrence.  Indeed, 
whether the new Gastarbeiter and his family can successfully integrate European society 
remains to be seen. 
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